Due to complex interactions in nancial markets, nancial regulations can sometimes produce unexpected outcomes, and fail to achieve their macroeconomic goals. We replicate a previous agent-based simulation study which showed that the Basel banking regulations may increase nancial instability, counter to their intended purpose. Our replication con rms that this is the case, following the original study's assumption that the nancial rms' behaviors are xed. We then extend the model to account for a possible strategic response, where nancial rms adapt to the regulatory regime. Using empirical game-theoretic analysis, we derive equilibria with and without regulation. We nd that in the new Basel-regulated equilibria, more funds stay out of default and banks lose less capital. e overall e ect of regulation on nancial stability becomes benign on most measures when accounting for the strategic adaptation of agents.
INTRODUCTION
e nancial crisis in 2008 marked a seismic shi in perceptions of how markets operate. Its reverberations are still being felt now in debt markets around the world [Sha er, 2016] . e question of how nancial crises arise time and again in the midst of sophisticated and logically motivated actors is still incompletely understood. A er an initial rush in academic circles to develop new economic models to re ect forensic evidence from the crash and to recommend regulation to prevent future crashes, we have been le with a plethora of di erent viewpoints.
One approach that has gained in uence even in crisis-unrelated research [Healy and Palepu, 2001 ] focuses on the fact that buyers and sellers do not have the same access to information about assets, especially in the context of debt markets. Based on this asymmetry, Bernanke et al. [1999] showed that periodic, deep nancial crashes are endemic due to an overreaction to interest rate changes.
e recommendation is clear: force sellers to be more transparent about their wares. Almost everyone agrees that making more information available is a good policy, and regulators commonly work towards this goal.
ere are many other convincing perspectives on the crisis. e irrational exuberance [Shiller, 2015] narrative posits a deep behavioral reason for market malfunction. It is also popular to point to systemic factors like lax lending standards and oversight leading to market participants whose priorities move away from the proper valuation of assets [Commission, 2011] . Another body of work points to the seizure of credit markets at the most critical juncture of the crisis for amplifying the crisis. is failure has been a ributed to either too much re nancing during normal times [Roberts and Su , 2009] or a run on liquidity [Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010] in response to nancial panic. Agent-based simulations elaborating on traditional economic models have also been used. Bookstaber et al. [2017] introduce one where agents have xed re-sale behavior and the spread of the crisis can subsequently be measured through di erent pathways.
All of these models can explain some aspects of the nancial crisis, and suggest various emphases for macroeconomic policy and regulation. Given the complexity of the nancial system, however, it is di cult to draw direct conclusions from underlying causes to ideal policies. An alternative perspective is to start from the policies, and model the situations where they are bene cial or harmful. We take this perspective, focusing on international banking regulations in the Basel framework. Basel's salience follows from its central role in global nancial policy, and its force in governing the lending policies of major nancial institutions.
Basel regulations consist chie y of a limit to leverage, or the ratio of gross investment to wealth. By taking on debt, this ratio can become arbitrarily large without regulation. An institution with high leverage cannot pay its obligations if its investments underperform even slightly, so it seems natural that limiting leverage may help control default risk. at leverage levels turned out to predict the nancial crisis be er than interest rates evidences the centrality of this variable to nancial stability. 1 Regulator belief in limiting leverage is so strong that their most prominent operational regulation a er the crisis was to simply implement a stricter version of Basel. But as such policies had failed to immunize the nancial system, there is some uncertainty about how much the stricter version will help in the future. e leverage cycle model of Geanakoplos [2003] describes the ebb and ow of leverage, shedding light on how aggregate leverage may increase to dangerous levels. Importantly, the model endogenizes leverage, showing how it evolves through agent decision making. Several key predictions made by this model were borne out by asset behavior during the crisis. First, price uctuations were disproportionate to fundamental value changes. Second, the failure of a few highly leveraged investors had an outsize impact on prices. ird, the severe tightening of short term credit markets contributed to a deeper crash. All of these predictions were entailed by the model, with leverage choices at Walrasian equilibrium under perfect information.
While the model of Geanakoplos [2003] had the advantage of being fully analytical, it extended only to three periods and thus could not accommodate changing nancial regulation over time. In a discrete agent-based extension to the leverage cycle model, urner et al. [2012] and Poledna et al. [2014] introduced a Basel-style regulator that imposes a leverage limit on nancial rms. As in the latest round of Basel nancial regulations, the leverage limit in the model is more stringent in times of high asset price volatility. Using this model, Poledna et al. [2014] argue that Basel regulations could, counter to their purpose, contribute to nancial instability. In their model under certain se ings, market participants (or funds) defaulted more frequently and produced more volatile asset prices when a Basel-based leverage limit was implemented. Market participants also made less pro t. However, funds that defaulted were of a smaller size so that the cost per default decreased. A follow-up study by Aymanns and Farmer [2015] suggests that an inverted Basel regulation would be more e ective at preventing nancial crises.
Our contribution to this story is to observe that a certain xed assumption in these models, the aggression distribution, might naturally be considered a strategic choice by agents. We extend the model of Poledna et al. [2014] to a game, where the agents strategically choose their aggression level in response to the regulation regime. We employ simulation-based methods to analyze this game, identifying aggression distributions that are in approximate Nash equilibrium. Using this approach we reverse in aggregate the nding that Basel causes more defaults. Losses due to default decrease further, and agent pro ts decrease less. e overall case against Basel is thus weakened by our ndings.
In Section 2 we describe the model used by Poledna et al. [2014] , and explain the e ect of Basel regulations on the leverage cycle in this model. We also describe implementation details and assumptions used in the original work that carry over into our independent implementation. In Section 3 we argue that agent aggression levels in this model should be treated as strategic variables. We propose an approach to analyze the strategic adaptations of agent aggression using Nash equilibrium. Finally, we design an experiment that distinguishes the e ect of Basel on the leverage cycle for a xed set of agents (studied in previous work) from its e ect due to strategic adaptations of agents found in equilibrium. We measure the e ect of Basel on nancial stability by looking at default rate, agent pro ts, capital losses, and price volatility. e strategic adaptation of agents on its own improved every measure except price volatility, which was unchanged. In aggregate, we nd that Basel decreases default rate and capital losses while also decreasing agent pro ts and increasing price volatility. Following Poledna et al. [2014] , we adopt and extend the basic leverage cycle model of Geanakoplos [2010] . is model has been credited with predicting characteristics of the 2008 nancial crisis years in advance. By treating leverage as an endogenous decision, it characterizes equilibrium in nancial markets in terms of leverage taken by each agent in addition to the asset price and the interest rate on debt. Since Basel targets leverage as a policy variable, the leverage cycle model seems like a natural candidate for evaluating recent nancial regulation.
AN AGENT-BASED MODEL OF THE LEVERAGE CYCLE
However, the original leverage cycle model is limited in its ability to express real-world complexity. For example, it cannot be extended for an arbitrary number of periods and short asset positions are not considered. Basel regulation, since it responds to the historical volatility of asset prices, is not easily incorporated. To address such issues, Poledna et al. [2014] develop a discrete agent-based model (ABM). At a high level, this model clears the market in each period for persistent nancial agents. Agents carry over their wealth to each new period, where demand undergoes a random shock and new prices are formed. Basel regulation is easily expressed in this new model since a regulator may act in each period with knowledge of historical prices. e ip side is that agents are no longer coming to an intertemporal equilibrium as in the leverage cycle model. But leverage remains an endogenous decision by each market participant. Poledna et al. [2014] include four types of agent, who interact in a market for a single risky asset. e asset has a fundamental value, V , and a market price p(t) at time t, determined by the cumulative demand of all agents. e central actors are informed value investors called fund managers. Fund managers know the fundamental value and adjust their demand for the asset based on a mispricing signal m = V − p t . e fund managers exhibit heterogeneous demand as a function of m, re ecting their di ering levels of aggression in pursuing investment opportunities. e more aggressive a fund is, the more leverage it will take to pursue a given mispricing signal. Aggression re ects factors such as a fund's con dence that the asset price will return to its fundamental in short order, and its tolerance for risk. A fund manager that buys an asset while it is priced under its fundamental is be ing that the price will move back up and make her a pro t. To buy or short-sell assets, fund managers may take loans from the bank, treated as an agent in the ABM of Poledna et al. [2014] . e bank provides credit to funds but requires a set amount of collateral per unit debt. In e ect, this collateral requirement imposes a leverage limit. To see this, consider how a leveraged investor keeps her books. She knows that to borrow a dollar from the bank she must commit some amount of wealth as collateral. Call this collateral requirement X . But she only has so much wealth, W , to commit in total. us there is a maximum amount she can borrow, W /X , which is constant given W . e ratio of this maximum amount to her current wealth is 1/X . If the bank decides to increase X , it e ectively decreases the leverage limit. In practice, we refer to the bank se ing a leverage limit without relating explicitly to collateral. In general the investor is taking on debt in order to take a larger investment position, which she is free to do until she is over the leverage limit. en she must wind down her investment position and reduce her debt until she is in compliance with the bank.
Agent-Based Model
us, in any given time period, funds are limited in the size of the asset position they can take, either long or short, in response to asset mispricings. Note that the bank may be forced to take losses when fund managers default. ese losses are recorded but the bank itself never defaults, as it is assumed that there is an unlimited bailout fund.
Mispricings are made possible by stochastic, weakly mean-reverting asset demand from aptly named noise traders.
e noise traders represent a collection of ill-informed investors. eir collective behavior exerts a random shock to total asset demand, which in turn shi s the marketclearing asset price.
e nal agent type is the fund investor. e fund investor's role is simply to move capital from fund managers with poor (historical) performance, toward those with good performance.
The Leverage Cycle and Basel: Intuition
It is easy to see that without any limits on leverage, the price of the asset would always return to its fundamental value, as funds would just increase their position against the direction of the shock until the mispricing disappears. It requires just one fund able to take unlimited size positions on the asset to ensure that there is never any price volatility around V . But with leverage limits, the system exhibits complete leverage cycles over time. e qualitative steps to the cycle are shown in Figure 1 . When shocks are small enough, wealth in the system becomes more and more concentrated in the most aggressive funds as they take more e ective leverage in pursuing mispricing opportunities.
is gradually increases the sensitivity of total wealth in the system to random price shocks until Session 3b: Economic Equilibrium EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA some investors reach their leverage limit. At that point, a decrease in the asset price would push the leverage ratio over the limit, 2 and so the investor would be forced to sell to get back in compliance when she would actually rather be buying the asset. is action is procyclical, since the act of selling further depresses the price, which can lead to further deleveraging by other funds. It may even induce a mass sell-o (or buy-o for short positions) as other, formerly less leveraged funds struggle to satisfy the leverage limit due to the acceleration of the price movement against their positions. Eventually enough funds have either defaulted or deleveraged that, collectively, they have become insensitive to further price movements, and the cycle begins again. Price volatility, probability of investor default, and losses on defaulted loans are all elevated due to this leverage cycle.
Within this model we can also incorporate Basel-style regulation, which makes leverage limits more stringent during periods of high volatility and less stringent otherwise. Under xed fund behavior, this increases the probability that investors get into procyclical situations, since the leverage limits themselves will adapt to be procyclical. Intuitively, higher leverage limits in volatile times could allow funds to provide a voice of reason and return the price to the asset's fundamental value. So Basel, by doing the opposite, potentially makes volatility and default more likely. On the other hand, Basel may reduce the losses su ered by the bank on defaulted loans, since the doomed funds were forced to deleverage more quickly before their default.
Our study starts by reimplementing this ABM and replicating the original results. e remainder of this section describes model details; our extension to incorporate strategic response is described in Section 3. To implement the model, we used as references the description of Poledna et al. [2014] together with code provided by these authors in response to our queries. Unless otherwise stated, all of the following modeling decisions and parameters are as implemented in the prior work. We a empt to keep the model as close as possible to prior work in order to isolate the e ect that our equilibrium concept has on the evaluation of Basel policies. ese assumptions were justi ed in the original work by drawing parallels with real data on nancial crashes.
Schedule
e state of the market is de ned by an equilibrium asset price and the resulting holdings and debt levels of the fund managers. e agent-based simulation iterates between a price formation phase and a wealth update phase. We describe these phases at a high level below to give a sense of the scheduling of tasks.
Price Formation.
(1) Each fund manager has a xed demand as a function of the mispricing signal and its current wealth. ese demand functions depend on the maximum leverage allowed by banks as well as the fund's idiosyncratic aggression parameter. (2) Noise traders demand the asset according to a stochastic process such that without fund managers the asset price would weakly mean revert around the fundamental value of the asset (an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process). e noise trader's demand is what makes the mispricing signal nonzero in each period. (3) e price of the asset is set at a level that clears the market given the collection of demand functions submi ed by noise traders and fund managers. is is the Walrasian equilibrium.
Wealth Update of Fund Managers.
( 1) e new asset price as determined in the price-formation phase induces revised wealth levels for each of the fund managers based on the market value of their holdings. (2) e fund investors obtain a new datapoint regarding the pro tability of each fund manager by observing the wealth gained or lost in this update. ey withdraw or deposit capital into funds accordingly. (3) Banks enforce leverage limits on funds. Funds that exceed leverage limits are subject to a margin call, requiring they change their position in the asset to comply with the limit. Note that the violation of leverage limits can be triggered by a change in asset price, by the movement of capital by fund investors, or some combination.
Basic Definitions
We de ne the key variables describing the state of a fund h at time t.
(1) D h (t) is the amount of the asset that the fund holds at t. It may be positive, meaning the fund owns a positive amount of the asset, or negative, indicating a short position. (2) M h (t) is the cash position of the fund. e cash balance is changed each period based on purchases or sales of the asset. A negative M h (t) indicates a debt position. (3) e wealth of a fund is de ned by
where recall that p(t) is market price of the asset. All nondefaulted funds have W h (t) > 0. is entails in particular that a short asset position is always accompanied by a positive cash position. (4) e leverage taken by each rm is de ned as
Recalling that W h (t) within a period is constant and positive, and therefore the numerator is always positive, λ h (t) ∈ [0, ∞). It can in principle be made arbitrarily large by taking an investment position of su cient magnitude, although due to leverage restrictions the funds are constrained in the positions they can take. Note that leverage is ill de ned for W h (t) ≤ 0.
ese de nitions allow for a fund to have short and long positions on an asset. For a given wealth, a fund with a long position has a positive value of asset holdings D h (t)p(t) with cash M h (t) unrestricted. A common scenario is negative M h (t), meaning the fund has taken on debt to nance their long position. is necessarily makes D h (t)p(t) > W h (t). us any fund indebted to the bank must have λ h (t) ≥ 1.
On the other hand, a fund with a short position owes future shares to its counterparty (D h (t) < 0) but holds the cash it obtained from the sale of these future shares (M h (t) > 0). If the price of the asset p(t) increases, the wealth of a fund that is long on the asset goes up while the wealth of a fund that is short goes down. e opposite occurs if p(t) decreases.
Regulatory Environments
In the somewhat misnamed unregulated environment, λ h (t) is constrained to be less than a parameter λ max for all h.
e Basel environment adaptively selects maximum leverage λ
between periods based on price volatility σ (t). λ
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where σ b = 0.0118 is a set benchmark level of volatility, and σ (t) is measured as the average volatility of the log asset price in the previous 10 periods. Before 10 periods are available, all price data is used. us, maximum leverage requirements are adjusted downwards in periods of high volatility and are allowed to reach λ max when volatility is low. In the unregulated case, λ max is still a hard limit on leverage but it does not adapt to market conditions.
Fund Demand
Leverage limits e ectively constrain the maximum and minimum demand for each fund manager. Individually, each fund manager h with aggression parameter β h has a demand D h (t) of the following form, at time t:
otherwise Here the price p(t) at time t is the free variable and all other quantities are xed. e fundamental value is set at V = 1 and W h (t − 1) denotes the total wealth accumulated by h in the last period. In the original study [Poledna et al., 2014] , the aggression parameter β h is xed to be h × 5 where h ∈ {1, . . . , 10} is the index of the fund, of which there are ten in total. In our strategic analysis we allow the funds to choose the β h 's, but for now they are xed. Notice that in the lower and upper regions of price, demand does not depend on β h . In particular, demand is xed in these regions.
is comes from the fact that funds have hit their leverage limit and cannot borrow further to pursue investment opportunities. An example of the demand function for two funds with di erent β h is shown in Figure 2 . 
Market Clearing Price
Every period, prices are used to coordinate asset allocation. Each fund submits their demand function truthfully and an equilibrium is found a er the noise traders generate stochastic demand. Each period gets its own independent price. e only thing that transfers information between periods is the wealth that each fund ends up holding. Given the demand functions of all funds as well as the noise trader demand C(t), prices are formed via the market clearing condition
where C(t) is generated by
e noise parameter σ n is set to 0.035 and χ (t) is an i.i.d. standard Gaussian draw. Parameter ρ is set to 0.99, representing extremely weak mean reversion. is is the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, a standard model in nance for asset price dynamics.
We set N = 10 9 . Equation (2) is a piecewise linear function of p(t) which can be solved using standard methods.
Wealth Update
Using the p(t) (recall it is embedded in the demand functions D h (t)) obtained as solution to (2), the wealth of each fund W h (t) can now be updated. Assume for now that D h (t − 1) is positive, that is, fund h takes a long position. ere are three possible sources of wealth change in the model: market value of assets, interest payments, and equity ows. e increase in asset value for each fund is simply D h (t − 1)[p(t) − p(t − 1)], and re ects the return on an investment made in the previous period. is is the fund's pro t or loss.
In general, funds nance their investment opportunities using debt from the bank. If the amount of cash M h (t) = W h (t) − D h (t)p(t) is negative, then the fund has borrowed from the bank to buy D h (t) shares of the asset. In this case the fund pays a xed interest rate S = 0.015%. A er paying interest, the fund's total available assets for withdrawal is now
e other source for changes in wealth is withdrawals or deposits made by fund investors. ese make their decisions based on recent performance of each fund. Fund investors examine each fund's rate of return (estimated using an exponential moving average) r h (t) and withdraw/deposit an amount F h (t) as follows:
where the benchmark return r b is 0.003 and b, controlling how strongly fund investors react to historical performance, is set at 0.15. e overall motion equation for wealth is then 2.9 Default Each fund starts with W 0 = 2 × 10 6 in wealth. Default occurs when wealth goes below a critical value W e = 2 × 10 5 . In this case, the fund's wealth, demand, and cash positions become zero for 100 timesteps, a er which the fund is resuscitated at the same level of aggression β h and given W 0 to start operations again.
SYSTEMIC RISK EVALUATION
e motivation for using this model is to see what e ect regulation can have on the leverage cycle, and how this impacts systemic risk. We rst develop an approach for evaluating the e ect of regulation when fund managers are given the opportunity to adapt strategically according to changing external conditions. en we de ne metrics for measuring systemic risk and perform an experiment measuring the e ects of the strategic adaptations on systemic risk.
Strategic Aggression Behavior
Recall from Section 2.6 that each fund is assigned an aggression level. We call these assignments the aggression distribution. Poledna et al. [2014] assume that the aggression distribution is xed. is assumption is problematic for several reasons, but fundamentally because it limits the responsiveness of fund behavior to environmental conditions, either of the market or the regulatory system.
We focus on this assumption in particular because the entire model appears to be highly sensitive to the aggression distribution. For example, if all funds have low aggression then leverage will almost never be high enough to induce defaults. As circumstantial evidence for this, in all the experiments described in Section 3.4, no fund at an aggression level of 5 ever defaulted. is may be considered an extreme se ing, but it is disturbing that one can generate almost any story one wants by manipulating this xed assumption. It is far be er to derive the aggression distribution from something more fundamental, like strategic choice.
erefore we treat aggression level as an endogenous variable, taking account of the dependence of each fund's payo on the aggression of other players. at is, we cast the entire scenario as a game played among funds, where aggression distributions are strategy pro les and aggression levels are strategies. is allows us to search through the space of possible aggression distributions to nd a Nash equilibrium where no fund can make more pro t by changing their aggression level. is approach, notably, leaves each fund's aggression level (and thus demand function) in a given period xed. Within a given time period we still have perfect information and complete markets, so clearing the asset market still produces a Walrasian equilibrium. e only intertemporal choice funds make is aggression level, which is chosen for all periods simultaneously. us our strategic analysis is limited to aggression levels, that is, we do not consider other strategic market behavior. 3 is preserves the spirit of the leverage cycle story for a given equilibrium choice of aggression distribution. We see below that the aggregate e ect of equilibrating prices in each period and aggression over all periods has a substantial e ect on nancial stability.
Experimental Setup
In our approach we evaluate the introduction of Basel into the model on two dimensions. First, given a particular aggression distribution, we measure the e ect of regulatory environment on systemic risk measures. is isolates the e ect of Basel on the leverage cycle story given xed aggression levels. Second, given a particular regulatory environment, we look at the e ect of changing the distribution of fund aggression levels. is isolates the e ect of Basel on the strategic choice of aggression levels while leaving its e ect on the leverage cycle constant. Nash Equilibrium. First, some de nitions and implementation details. A pure pro le is an Hdimensional vector β containing a single aggression level, or strategy, for each of H funds. For our study we chose a number of funds H ∈ {10, 21} and a set of 7 possible aggression levels/strategies Γ = {5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, 50}. us a particular fund's mixed strategy is a 7-dimensional vector of positive real numbers summing to 1, corresponding to the probabilities that the fund will pick each of the seven strategies for use over the entire simulation. A mixed strategy D induces a probability distribution over pure pro les. Drawing from Γ using the multinomial distribution speci ed by D assigns a β h to each of the H funds.
ere are many strategy pro les and we cannot evaluate them all. Our focus is on pro les that are strategically stable. A mixed strategy D * is stable if no fund has an incentive to deviate from drawing its strategy from D * . In other words, D * is a mixed strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium over fund aggression levels. e problem becomes nding D * in a computationally feasible way, since the number of pro les increases exponentially with the number of players and strategies. To do this, we rst need to de ne how the game is played and how payo s are generated.
Payo s and Game De nition.
Each run of the model provides a ready made payo : the fee earned by each fund. To nd this fee, we rst run the model for T = 50, 000 periods using H ∈ {10, 21} funds and a given β vector representing the aggression level for each fund. At the end of the simulation, we annualize into 1000 years containing 50 periods each as before. In each year i starting at periods t, we calculate the average size of fund h, W h (i) = F h (t), which is simply the change in wealth net of investor withdrawals and deposits over the course of the year. e fee for year i is then de ned as 0.2ζ h (i) + 0.02W h (i) and the total fees over the entire simulation for fund h are
is is the speci cation used by Poledna et al. [2014] , based on standard practice in the nancial industry. It captures the common 2-and-20 fee structure, which pays hedge funds 2% of assets under management and 20% of value returned to investors annually. is annualization (1000 years that are each 50 periods long) is done according to the original paper [Poledna et al., 2014] , where the model was calibrated to real yearly data. Note that the payo for a given mixed strategy D depends on whether or not Basel is active as well as λ max and is an average over many 50,000-period simulations where pure pro les β are generated from D.
Environmental Se ings. In summary, we can view the model input as choice of regulation R, a particular β vector of strategies representing a pure pro le, and parameters λ max . e model itself can be viewed as a black box function, mapping to the model output which is a vector of rewards, or fees, for each fund. In reality, remember that we are relying on separate Walrasian equilibria in each of the 50,000 periods to set prices.
Finding the Nash equilibrium distribution D * (R, λ max ) of such a system requires searching through input β and evaluating fees until an equilibrium is found. We adopt a heuristic approach, inexhaustively exploring a space of strategy pro les and estimating their payo s through agentbased simulation. is method goes by the name of empirical game-theoretic analysis [Wellman, 2016] , as it applies standard game-theoretic concepts to a game model derived by empirical means. We use a suite of tools developed by Cassell and Wellman [2013] to automate the simulation and Session 3b: Economic Equilibrium EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA data management. We were able to obtain approximate D * (R, λ max ) for R ∈ {Basel, Unregulated} and λ max ∈ {8, 20}. ese levels of λ max were chosen to re ect a wide range of conditions. Note that we chose to show results for the same set of strategies Γ as that used by Poledna et al. [2014] .
is was mainly for comparability, but we did test lower minimum (down to 1), higher maximum (up to 70), and a ner resolution in between for aggression levels. We found that the results were not qualitatively di erent. For example, a beta of 1 was not adopted in the mixed strategy equilibrium when added to the reported set of strategies. In all tested cases, Basel encouraged less average aggression in equilibrium.
Empirical Game-eoretic Analysis. Our empirical game approach imposes two major approximations. First, the set of available strategies Γ is restricted to a modest number of enumerated choices. As noted above, we limit a ention to |Γ| = 7 choices of aggression level. Since the number of strategy pro les is exponential in the number of strategies, we have no choice but to impose such a limit. Second, for the H = 21 se ing we used a technique called deviation preserving reduction [Wiedenbeck and Wellman, 2012] , which employs aggregation to model the 21-player game in terms of a reduced six-player game.
Systemic Risk Metrics
Our metrics for systemic risk di er from those provided by Poledna et al. [2014] in one key respect. Rather than focusing on the risk of the most aggressive fund manager, we instead evaluate risk aggregated over all fund managers. e aggregate measure re ects a more direct evaluation of the entire economy. Moreover, as we allow distribution of aggression to vary based on endogenous choices, we need a way to evaluate the riskiness across situations with di erent maximum aggression levels. is di erence is only relevant for measuring probability of default and capital losses. 4
Probability of Default. To calculate probability of default of a single fund for a single run of the model, we record the years during which a default occurred. en we divide the number of defaults by the number of years during which default was possible, K h . K h ≤ 1000 because defaulted funds go out of operation for 2 years, or 100 time steps, as speci ed in Section 2.3. us, there are entire years during which default is impossible. Note that there are also years during which default is only partially possible as the fund is still in a defaulted state at the beginning of the year. We choose to exclude these years from K h as well. e overall probability of default is then
Here, recall that H is the total number of funds.
Capital Losses to Banks. Capital losses are the amount of loss banks su er when a fund manager defaults. It is de ned as the wealth W h (t) of the defaulting fund at default. is is an important metric for systemic risk because these losses are o en paid for through bank bailouts, which detract from social welfare.
Capital losses were measured on an annual basis, in the same way as for probability of default. Yearly capital losses are totaled, then averaged across the number of funds and number of years during which default was possible.
Price Volatility. Price volatility is detrimental to the extent it contributes to nancial uncertainty. One of the functions of nancial markets is e cient price discovery, and one might hope that in a single asset market where some investors have perfect information about the fundamental value of the asset, this function would be performed well. Price volatility is a good proxy for how well price discovery is performed. Indeed, if we allow h D h (t) to be large compared to C(t) for all t, we would expect price volatility to be near zero as the e ect of the noise traders is minimized. Price volatility is the average of the annual variances of p(t). is metric does not depend on K h like the other two, since prices can be formed regardless of the default status of any fund.
Systemic Risk Results
First we note that in every se ing we evaluated, the strategy pro le that maximized total fees was for every fund to use β h = 5. is is the least aggressive strategy available, and is the most limiting in the range of investment choices available to the fund. e only bene t to playing this strategy is that it mitigates the leverage cycle and may prevent crashes from happening. is is circumstantial evidence that defaults are very harmful not only to banks and investors, but also to the funds themselves. It also provides a basis for believing that strategy pro les with low aggression may be be er for systemic risk. Fig. 3 . Mixed-strategy symmetric equilibria for di erent regulatory regimes and leverage restrictions.
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria. We found an approximate mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for each of 8 environmental se ings, shown in Figure 3 . We also report β weighted , which is the average value of β h drawn from each distribution over strategies. Notice that decreasing λ max and imposing Basel both decrease the β weighted of the Nash equilibrium. When Basel is imposed, it is no longer as lucrative for funds to be aggressive since they will reach their leverage limits immediately. Decreasing λ max has a similar e ect. is strategic response has rami cations on our systemic risk measures.
Interestingly, all equilibria are far from the social optimum. is is because it takes coordination to prevent defaults and maximize pro ts. Unilaterally playing a less aggressive strategy has positive externalities, namely a lower default rate and crash rate for all agents, that are not internalized by fund payo s.
Systemic Risk under Equilibria. When Basel is imposed on a previously unregulated market, two things happen in equilibrium. First, the mechanics of fund behavior change as their leverage limits become more stringent in volatile periods. Second, funds adapt their aggression to t the regulation, shi ing to less aggresive (on average) Nash equilibria over mixed strategies as in Figure 3 . To evaluate these two e ects on nancial stability, we rst select an mixed strategy equilibrium. Next, we take 200 draws from the distribution. Each draw is a valid strategy pro le. We calculate the Session 3b: Economic Equilibrium EC '17, June 26-30, 2017 , Cambridge, MA, USA metrics from Section 3.3 on each of these 200 strategy pro les both with and without Basel. e averages are presented in Figure 5 and Figure 4 . Fig. 4 . Three systemic risk metrics evaluated at two levels of λ max for 21 funds. Analagous table for 10 funds in Figure 5 . Within a table, each row fixes an equilibrium mixed strategy and applies a di erent regulatory se ing, each column fixes a regulatory se ing and switches to a di erent mixed strategy equilibrium. Down arrows signify that the metric decreased when Basel was applied in the study by Poledna et al. [2014] while up arrows signify that the metric increased. Blue le ering means changing that property results in a metric change that agrees with Poledna et al. [2014] while red means changing that property results in a metric change that goes against their finding. Black means that there was no significant change in the variable. Example: For λ max = 20's default probability table, up arrow means that Poledna et al. [2014] found Basel increased default probability. Fixing profiles and changing se ings agrees with this finding, indicating successful replication, while fixing se ing and changing profiles goes against this finding.
Each table shows two-dimensional variation across regulatory environments. Along rows, we keep the mixed strategy equilibrium xed and change the environment. Along columns, we keep the regulatory se ing xed and change the equilibrium. For every metric and se ing we tested, shi ing between Basel and unregulated environments under a xed equilibrium resulted in the same e ect on the metric as that reported by Poledna et al. [2014] . is should not be surprising since with a xed aggression distribution, we are essentially repeating their experiment with slightly di erent aggression se ings. is is con rmation that we have done a successful replication.
Something interesting happens when we examine these tables along columns. is is equivalent to xing the regulatory environment and switching between mixed strategy equilibria. We have already seen that the average β h for Basel equilibria is substantially lower. It turns out that less aggressive funds increase nancial stability by decreasing the probability of default and bank capital losses. For example, at λ max = 20, even though Basel makes default more likely for a xed aggression distribution, the shi towards the Basel equilibrium counteracts and reverses this e ect for both H = 10 and H = 21. In aggregate (that is, moving from the Basel/Basel cell to the Unregulated/Unregulated one), the story has changed. Basel decreases probability of default in every measured case. Capital losses, which were already decreasing in the original study, decrease even further. Price volatility still increases with Basel, since the shi in equilibrium did not have an e ect. Fees are lower in the Basel se ing, but by less than was predicted by Poledna et al. [2014] . Shi ing between equilibria increases fees in most cases to cancel out some of the fee loss found in the original study.
Discussion
So what explains Basel's performance in decreasing systemic risk? We break this question into two parts. First, how does Basel allow less aggressive funds to thrive compared to aggressive ones? And second, why do less aggressive funds allow for be er nancial stability?
Consider this model with a single fund manager. Suppose she is currently operating in the unregulated environment with λ max = 20 and she hears that Basel will soon be implemented.
is can only lower her leverage limit. We posit that even without any strategic interactions with other funds, she will be inclined to lower her aggression levels. A fund gets more fees by generating higher returns, and higher returns are go en by taking high leverage when there are large mispricing signals. When leverage limits are high, an aggressive fund will just snap up all the mispriced assets at and pro t o of all of them. But when leverage limits become more stringent under Basel, too much aggression will quickly lead to paralysis due to hi ing the leverage limit. In contrast, less aggression will preserve some investment capacity for the truly large mispricing signals, generating a be er return. Now consider two funds who each know that Basel is coming. If they both decide to be aggressive, they can mitigate more price movements, reduce price volatility, and operate as if Basel was never implemented. However, if fund A decides to shirk its price enforcing duties by being less aggressive, Basel will restrict maximum leverage since price volatility will rise. is doesn't a ect fund A much Session 3b: Economic Equilibrium EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA since it doesn't take much leverage anyway. In fact, in all of our simulations, the funds playing strategy β h ∈ {5, 10} never defaulted a single time. But the leverage limit does a ect the more aggressive fund B, and will cause it to default eventually. When this happens, A will have the entire market to itself. When this strategic advantage is coupled with the fact that less aggressive funds stand to make more pro t regardless of what other funds do, it is easy to see why Basel induces funds to be less aggressive. Now why does the shi to a less aggressive set of funds result in be er default rates, bank losses, and fees while not having any e ect on price volatility? Note that here we are only giving intuition for the e ect of the shi in aggression distribution, not the aggregate e ect of Basel.
Less aggressive funds simply do not take much leverage before the mispricing signal disappears randomly. us, they never get to the point where a price shock can cause them to lose all their wealth. Again we quote the result that not a single low-aggression fund defaulted in our experiments. us, default rates decrease when funds are less aggressive. Funds that are aggressive under equilibrium that end up defaulting also cause less capital loss to banks. Recall the feedback cycle that occurs with Basel. First, aggressive rms accumulate all the wealth in good times since Basel hasn't kicked in yet. en, a price shock happens that forces the aggressive funds to wind down their positions to comply with collateral requirements. is procyclical unwinding deepens the initial shock, increasing volatility and forcing Basel to make leverage limits more stringent. When there are many less aggressive funds, none of this volatility can be absorbed and the Basel requirements will get extremely stringent. us, the funds that end up defaulting will have been trying to reach a lower leverage limit. is reduces their size when they default.
Fees are slightly helped by less aggression for the same reason funds decided to be less aggressive in the rst place. And price volatility is de nitely hurt in normal times by less aggressive funds, but the decrease in default rate re ects a lower incidence of nancial crashes, which helps price volatility. It seems these two e ects cancel out.
CONCLUSION
When evaluating the e ect of nancial regulation on markets, we should always be aware that agents in this arena are highly sophisticated and resourceful. It is a good bet that any possible path to pro t will eventually be explored. So when economic models make xed assumptions on behavior, we should always be on guard for the day these assumptions start break down. To become more robust, models can endogenize important behavioral assumptions so that agent response to the environment is as realistic as possible.
We argue for endogenizing the aggression level of funds in an agent based leverage cycle model used to evaluate Basel regulations. We then propose a strategic analysis that endogenizes an important xed assumption, the aggression distribution. A er making appropriate approximations to make nding equilibria feasible, we perform a series of experiments to measure the aggregate e ect of Basel on nancial stability under our new equilibrium concept. Our ndings suggest that the pessimism surrounding Basel's exacerbation of leverage cycles may be overstated. We nd that irrecoverable losses on the part of banks and defaulted funds are reduced substantially under Basel. Although fund pro ts fall, our new equilibrium concept lessens the fall compared to the one without endogenous aggression. Volatility remains a problem, as funds still cannot prevent day to day uctuations in price e ectively.
ere is still much work to be done, both in evaluating Basel and in building richer economic models. For the former, the obvious question is how to improve on Basel so that we get its bene ts (less aggressive agents on average) without its costs (agents constrained from taking volatility Session 3b: Economic Equilibrium EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA out of prices). ere has been some work on this, but not under endogenous aggression levels [Aymanns and Farmer, 2015 , Poledna et al., 2015 , Poledna and urner, 2016 . ere are also many other directions where computer science techniques can aid in understanding Basel. For example, using network science and graph theory to model nancial networks could help us understand how contagion works and how regulation a ects it. e way we solve for equilibria in agent based models can also be studied further. For example, how close does clearing the market in each period independently come to preserving Pareto e ciency in a multi-period se ing? How does imperfect information a ect regarding noise traders play into this? In addition, in our analysis we xed aggression to be constant throughout the entire simulation. is was mainly to not disturb the market clearing process within each time step. But perhaps there is a way to combine the market clearing mechanism and the strategic aggression adjustments so that they interact with each other. is would make for a less interpretable model but may be more realistic for certain markets.
